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This paper defends the idea that disputes which do not feature conflicts in literally-expressed con-
tents could express genuine disagreement. Using the model of metalinguistic negotiation and Stalnake-
rian common ground, the paper argues that many such disputes are driven by the conversational parties’
disagreements in the meaning of expressions. The disputants convey and settle their disagreement prag-
matically, negotiating the meanings of terms under controversy by using instead of mentioning the terms.
The paper further examines how the disputants collect cues from the conversation to become aware of
the metalinguistic nature of their dispute and explains why such an account is compatible with semantic
externalism, by clarifying the scope and limits of metalinguistic negotiation.
1 Introduction
The paper seeks to defend the possibility that dispute between speakers could express
genuine disagreement, even if the speakers mean dierent things by the same term they
both use and literally express rationally compatible content. This is against an accepted
way of reasoning, which insists that the speakersmustmean the same thing by their com-
mon term in order to genuinely disagreewith each other. To explain such a possibility, the
paper starts by introducing themetalinguistic negotiationmodel, according towhich con-
versational participants negotiate the proper meaning to use for certain common terms
by using instead of mentioning the very term. The paper further claries this model by
reviewing it in light of the Stalnakerian common ground. It sees the eorts of conversa-
tional participants to decide whichmeaning to use for the common term as a negotiation
regarding what to include within their interpretative common ground, the common in-
formation body about language presupposed by conversational participants for eective
communication to happen.
The paper then proceeds to respond to two challenges against metalinguistic ne-
gotiation model raised by Herman Cappelen, a speaker-error objection that speakers en-
gaging with these disputes do not see themselves as debating the meaning of words, and
the externalist criticism that the model assumes a control of speakers over meaning that
does not exist, which makes it incompatible with mainstream semantic externalism. Re-
garding the speaker-error objection, the paper points out that speakers approach these
disputes with the default assumption that there is no meaning dierence of the terms
they use, and it oentimes only becomes clear for the speakers when they collect cues
from their conversational proceedings that demonstrate their divergence in languageuse.
For the externalist argument, the paper claries that metalinguistic negotiation can only
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directly act on what people think, believe, presuppose, and their other attitudes toward
words’ meaning and reference, instead of the actual meaning of terms. The paper then
takes a step further, by exploring the possibility ofmetalinguistic negotiation to indirectly
contribute to the facts grounding themeaning of terms, by inuencing speakers’ attitudes
toward the meaning of terms and changing the use patterns.
2 Metalinguistic Negotiation Model, Explained
2.1 Mark Sainsbury’s "fishy" case
In his short paper Fishy Business, Mark Sainsbury tried to make sense of a 19th century
courtroomdebate between an inspector and an oilmerchant onwhetherwhale oil should
be taxed as sh oil. Both parties recognized that whales are lung-using, air-breathing
mammalian sea creatures but disagreed on the relevance of these facts. The inspector
used “sh” to designate all sea creatures while the merchant emphasized that mammals
cannot be sh.1 Do the speakers’ dierent ways of classication correspond to dierent
meanings of the expression “sh”? The oil merchant and the inspector applied radically
dierentmethodologies of classication and, as a result, used the term “sh” in systemat-
ically dierent ways. The oil merchant applied the term in such a way as to never include
mammals, while the inspector applied the term in such a way as to includemarinemam-
mals. The dierence holds true even when all the relevant factual information about
whales is on hand, making it dicult to pinpoint the factual basis of their dierent clas-
sications, unless they mean dierent things by the term “sh.” This, at the very least,
provides prima facie reasons for thinking that themerchant and the inspector meant dif-
ferent things for the term “sh.”
Call the above argumentdierent-meaning interpretationof the “shy” case. It quickly
faces a challenge that it fails to capture the observation, which we would like to preserve,
that the dispute between the merchant and the inspector expressed genuine disagree-
ment.2 The accepted view of disagreement tells us that it requires conict in content
literally expressed: if a dispute between speaker A and B expresses a genuine disagree-
ment, in which speaker A asserts that p and speaker B asserts that q, it must be rationally
incompatible for anyone to accept both p and q. It suggests that for any dispute to express
genuine disagreements, the speakers cannot talk past each other. According to this view,
if any dispute involves assertions of the form that the Fs are Gs and that the Fs are not
Gs, the speakers must mean the same thing by the terms “F” and “G” to assert something
rationally incompatible and avoid talking past each. This view of disagreement, which
requires conict in content literally expressed, helps draw a semantic conclusion about
“F” and “G” from our intuition of disagreement, and challenges the dierent-meaning
1Sainsbury, M., “Fishy Business,” Analysis 74, no. 1 (December 2013): 3.
2The observation that there is a genuine disagreement is worth defending for many reasons. The dispute would not have stopped
had they agreed that whales are lung-usingmammalian sea-creatures. There is also good evidence suggesting that the dispute heavily
centered onwhether whales are shes instead of other possible disagreements, since the trial largely proceeded with the jury hearing
evidence from eminent anatomists (saying that whales are not sh), merchants and seafaring men (mostly, but not in every case,
saying that whales are sh).
Aporia Vol. 21 25
interpretation of the “shy” case, because there is no conict in the content literally ex-
pressed.3 If the merchant and the inspector meant dierent things by the term “sh”,
the merchant asserted, in paraphrases, that whales are cold-blooded vertebrate animal
living wholly in water, while the inspector asserted that whales are sea creatures. The
speakers asserted compatible propositions, and did so by virtue of the fact that they in-
tended to mean dierent things by the same term “sh”. It is not rationally incompatible
for either of them to accept both of the two propositions. The dierent-meaning interpre-
tation, therefore, seems unable to validate our observation that the “shy” case involves
genuine disagreement.
2.2 Non-canonical Disputes and Metalinguistic Negotiation
The above challenge to the dierent meaning interpretation is misplaced because it mis-
takenly presumes that only canonical disputes — disputes that involve literal expression
of incompatible content — could express genuine disagreement. It is wrong to assume,
merelybasedon the recognitionof genuinedisagreement, that the relevant dispute should
involve the literal (semantic) expression of incompatible contents. Non-canonical disputes
— disputes centered on information that is not conveyed semantically — could express
genuine disagreements as well.4 For this paper, I am using the term dispute to refer to
any linguistic practice that appears to evince or express a genuine disagreement. And I
am using the term disagreement to involve conicting attitudes of speakers toward certain
content, such as acceptance, beliefs and desires, rather than what they utter. For two
speakers to disagree with each other there should be some objects p and q (e.g. proposi-
tions, plans, etc.) such that A accepts p and B accepts q, when it is rationally incompatible
for anyone to accept both p and q.5 However, the content in conictmaywell be conveyed
pragmatically without being literally expressed.
While the distinction between semantics and pragmatics is hard to draw, the pa-
per will make the distinction between the sentence meaning, the linguistic meaning of a
sentence-type, and speakers’ meaning, which consists of what is said and what is impli-
cated. This is themaximalist interpretation of this distinction, which emphasizes the dif-
ference between “primary” contextual processes and “secondary” contextual processes.6
Primary pragmatic processes are contextual processes that help determine what is said,
the proposition expressed by the sentence, while secondary pragmatic processes are in-
ferential processes that presuppose what is said, take it as input, and yield further propo-
sitions as output.7 For this paper, if a speaker conveys that p semantically/literally, the
proposition that p belongs to what is said, while what is conveyed pragmatically belongs
to what is implicated.
With the above concepts claried, consider the following case of disagreement
centered on information conveyed via implicature of relevance.




6Recanati, F., “What Is Said”, Synthese, 128 (2001): 79.
7Recanati, 79.
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(1a) Sally was able to solve the last problem on the test.
(1b) But Sally chose to quit before she got there.
The literal contents of (1a) and (1b) are rationally compatible, but there is an in-
compatibility between (1b) and the implicature of (1a), namely that Sally in fact solved the
last problem on the test. The genuine disagreement expressed by the dispute centered
on this incompatibility.8 The example demonstrates that the possibility of non-canonical
disputes to express genuine disagreement. Therefore, one could argue that in the “shy”
case the genuine disagreement between themerchant and the inspector did not center on
the propositions they asserted but on what the speakers pragmatically conveyed in addi-
tion. Themerchant and the inspector, when theymade the assertions, eachpragmatically
advocated for the meaning of “sh” he deemed appropriate. The two speakers pragmat-
ically proposed two meanings of “sh” incompatible for one to accept at the same time.
The conict in content, in this way, lies within what is pragmatically conveyed within the
conversation instead of its literally-expressed semantic content.
The dierent-meaning interpretation of the “shy” case, which locates the con-
ict in what the speakers convey pragmatically, helps shed light on a series of similar
questions across various elds of philosophy. When progressives and conservatives de-
bate whether gay marriage should be legal, do they mean the same thing by “marriage”?
When a sports radio host and his audience argue whether a racehorse could be an ath-
lete, do theymean the same thing by “athlete”?9 Whenmissionaries and cannibals debate
whether collecting human scalps is good, do they mean the same thing by “good”?10 If
one believes that in these disputes the speakers mean dierent things by their common
terms, we could analyze such non-canonical disputes as metalinguistic negotiations, dis-
putes where participants use (as opposed to mention) expressions whose meanings they
disagree about in order to resolve this very disagreement.11
2.3 Why Metalinguistic Negotiations are Worth Having
Metalinguistic negotiations are worth having, because how we use our words matters.
Conversational participants of metalinguistic negotiations feel the need to continue their
disputes, evenwhen it becomes commonground that they intend tomeandierent things
by the same term, because they have independent reasons for the incompatible mean-
ings of the expression they each pragmatically advocate for. In the above “shy” case,
although the merchant and the inspector both recognized that they intended to mean
dierent things by the term “sh,” they continued their dispute because they accepted
dierent classications and had economic consequences tied to the trial. In debate be-
tween gay right activists and conservatives over gay marriage, even if the conservatives
8Plunkett, D. and Timothy Sundell., “Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms”, Philosophers’ Imprint,
13, (2013): 12.
9Ludlow, P., Living Words Meaning Underdetermination and the Dynamic Lexicon (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2018): 78.
10Hare, R.M., The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1991): 148.
11Plunkett, D. and Timothy Sundell., “Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms”, Philosophers’ Imprint,
13, (2013): 10.
Aporia Vol. 21 27
make clear that they take “marriage” to mean a union between a male and a female, the
activistswill want to insist that thismeaning is unacceptable in order to advance same-sex
marriage rights.12 Similarly, a feminist may advocate that “woman” should refer to peo-
ple that are subordinated in virtue of their observed or imagined female bodily features,
because such an ameliorated meaning of “woman” will advance the feminist cause.13 All
these examples demonstrate that there are all types of reasons for speakers to battle over
the meanings of particular lexical items.
Speakers mostly accommodate others’ uses of words that dier from theirs to fa-
cilitate communication, unless they have fair enough reasons not to. These reasons con-
cern the expressive aspects of lexical items that one cannot stipulatively do awaywith (for
example, one cannot claim to use derogatory terms in a benign manner), the practical
benets of adopting certain meanings of terms that are xed in legal documents (“mar-
riage”, “rape”, “people”, etc.), the possibility of advancing social justice by advocating for
meaning revision of various terms (“queer”, “woman”, etc.), andmanymore. The reasons
to engagewithmetalinguistic negotiationsmay vary, but the case is strong enough to con-
clude that speakers can have good reasons to negotiate the use of expressions that they
do not want to accept.
What makes metalinguistic negotiations worth having distinguishes them from
merely verbal disputes, which arise solely in virtue of miscommunication and can be re-
solved aer well-received clarication. Merely verbal disputes are non-canonical dis-
putes that involve dierent meanings for common expressions but convey no genuine
disagreements. These disputes arise solely in virtue of miscommunication: one speaker
may take the other speaker to mean something dierent from what the other speaker
takes herself to mean by a particular expression, and both speakers actually accept the
other’s intended way of the using the expression aer clarication.14 Once it is common
ground what each speaker takes the expression to mean, there is no disagreement be-
tween the speakers for them to continue the dispute.
2.4 In Light of the Conversational Common Ground
We could better see howmetalinguistic negotiations unfold in practice in light of Robert
Stalnaker’s common ground model. Common ground, identied as the common beliefs
aboutwhat ismutually accepted, is both the end of the communicative actionwhich seeks
to add contents to the common ground and themeans available to the speaker that is nec-
essary for communication to take place. The speaker accepts that p as long as the speaker
treats it as true for some reason, and it is common belief that p among a group of believ-
ers if and only if all believe that p, all believe that all believe that p, all believe that all
believe that all believe that p, etc. The common ground includes the information that
must be available in order for the utterance to be reasonably taken as an act of communi-
12Both examples here involve a legal setting in which words and expressions written in law could not be easily changed, a fact that
motivates speakers to advocate for dierent meanings of the same term to use when the court and legal system interpret and apply
the law. These legal disputes involving dierent meanings are typical metalinguistic negotiations that are worth having.
13Haslanger, S., “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do WeWant Them To Be?”, Noûs, 34, no. 1 (2000): 52.
14Chalmers, D.J., “Verbal Disputes”, Philosophical Review, 120, no. 4 (January 2011): 526.
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cation.15 This part of common ground includes the presuppositions the speakers expect
the audience to have ready for use in making sense of what they say, many of which are
tied to particular words and accompany their use. This information bodywithin the com-
mon ground is what Mark Richard refers to as the interpretive common ground (ICG).1617
For example, when a competent English speaker speaks of bachelor using “bachelor”,
the speaker expects to be recognized as talking about an unmarried male and expects
the audience to access this idea via proper interpretation. The speaker normally presup-
poses that “bachelor” refers to unmarriedmale, and hence, that bachelors are unmarried
males. The latter follows by disquotation, which any competent speaker will hold to be
analytically true. Given the speaker’s presupposition that “bachelor” refers to unmarried
males, the speaker will have pro tanto reasons to think that anyone who does not share
this presupposition uses the term to mean something else. The kind of analyticity I am
introducing here could be seen as follows: that bachelors are unmarried males is true
for the speaker solely in virtue of the presupposition that “bachelor” refers to unmarried
male. This argument is inspired by Kevin Scharp’s analysis of constitutive principles for
concepts as principles to guide interpretation. If a speaker rejects a principle that one
takes to be constitutive for a concept in conversation, one then has a pro tanto reason to
think that they do not mean the same thing by the word in question.18
The genuine disagreements in metalinguistic negotiations, which are conveyed
pragmatically, are then expressed bymanifesting presuppositions about the ICG. If a par-
ticipant pragmatically conveys certain ways of using a term that violate part of what the
other participant presupposes to be part of the ICG, the latter may refuse to accommo-
date by blocking the proposed way of using the term from becoming part of the ICG. The
speakers then proceed to dispute whether the proposed way of using certain expression
ought to be added into the ICG, negotiating the meaning of the expressions. In the shy
case, the merchant presupposed that “sh” is used to talk about cold-blooded vertebrate
animal living wholly in water, and that shes are cold-blooded vertebrate animals living
wholly in water. On the other hand, the inspector presupposes that “sh” is used to talk
about sea-creatures, and that shes are just sea-creatures. Therefore, when the inspec-
tor asserted that whale oil is sh oil, the manifest occurrence of this assertion became
common ground, which not only proposed to add the semantic content of the assertion
to the common ground, but also pragmatically conveyed the metalinguistic message that
it is appropriate to use “sh” to talk about whales. This, at the very least, violates the
merchant’s presupposition that shes are vertebrate animals, which follows analytically
from the presupposition that “sh” does not refer to mammalian sea creatures. Maybe
it was still not clear to him that the inspector presupposed something completely dier-
ent about how to use the term “sh”, but it gave the merchant enough reason to start the
metalinguistic negotiation.
15Stalnaker, R., “Common Ground”, Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. 25, no. 5/6 (2002): 704.
16Richard, M., “The A-Project and the B-Project”, Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics(2020): 363.
17While I am using Richard’s term ICG to describe the presuppositions that a speaker expects her audience to recognize in order
to make sense of what she seeks to communicate, I am distancing myself from his view that meaning of lexical items is, to a rst
approximation, interpretive common ground. In fact, my take on meaning is quite dierent from this view, which I will detail in my
response to the externalist objection to the metalinguistic negotiation model in part three of the paper.
1818 Scharp, K., “Philosophy as the Study of Defective Concepts”, Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics (2020): 397.
Aporia Vol. 21 29
2.5 The Issue of Dependence Between Presuppositions
One nal note about metalinguistic negotiation model is that we must resist the mislead-
ingwayof explaining canonical disputes in virtue ofwhat is pragmatically conveyed about
meaning. For example, when a college student meets a at-Earther, the at-Earther as-
serts that the Earth is at. The college student responds by asserting that the Earth is
not at. Following the spirit of metalinguistic negotiation, one could argue that the two
speakers seek to adjust themeaning of the term “Earth” in their upcoming dispute. When
the at-Earther asserts that the Earth is at, the college student must have found it to be
a violation of what she presupposes to be part of the ICG, that it is inappropriate to use
“Earth” to designate something that is at and that the at-Earther probablymeans some-
thing dierent by the expression “Earth.”
Such analysis is blatantly wrong. The dispute between the at-Earther and the
college student is a canonical one in which the asserted propositions are incompatible.
The Earth is not at, and the at-Earther asserts something false. There are also rele-
vant factual disagreements between the speakers about the Earth: whether the Earth is
a at disc with the Arctic Circle in the center and whether there is a 150-foot-tall wall of
ice around its rim. It is not a case of non-canonical dispute, let alone metalinguistic ne-
gotiation. Moreover, that the Earth is at, or that the Earth is not at, is not something
that speakers presumably hold to be analytically true. That the Earth is not at, for the
college student, does not hold true solely in virtue of the meaning of the term “Earth”.
Conversely, the college student only presupposes that it is inappropriate to use “Earth” to
designate something that is at in virtue of her belief that it is commonly accepted that
the Earth is not at. This is something that she possibly learns by listening to her parents
as a child or reading a textbook, not just by mastering how to use the term “Earth.”
This illustrates the issue of dependence between presuppositions. The speakers
presuppose that the Fs are Gs if and only if they presuppose that “the Fs” refer to Gs. In
some cases (type A), the speaker presupposes that the Fs areGs because one presupposes
that “the Fs” refer to Gs. In other cases (type B), the speaker presupposes the latter be-
cause one presupposes the former. The “shy” dispute, as well as the other cases of met-
alinguistic negotiations, belongs to type A, while the at-Earth dispute, as well as other
cases of canonical disputes, belongs to type B. The presupposition that sh is not mam-
malian depends on the presupposition that “sh” refers to vertebrate animals, while the
presupposition that “Earth” does not designate something at depends on the presuppo-
sition that the Earth is not at. It is even possible that the college student does not believe
that this rule of appropriate use of the term “Earth” is common ground, if she does not
expect everyone to accept that the Earth is not at.19 The distinction between type-A and
type-B cases of dependence among presuppositions should help explainwhy themetalin-
guistic negotiation model should not apply to canonical disputes.
1919 While the idea that one should not expect someone to know that the Earth is not at may seem wild (a poll in 2018 suggested
that only two thirds of American millennial believe that the Earth is round), think of how experts adjust their presuppositions when
addressing technical problems to their friends who have no expertise in the eld. The experts may not presuppose that an average
user of what they hold to be jargons should only use the words in certain ways, because the experts do not expect an average speaker
to have the needed background expertise that drives one to use the words in these ways.
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3 Speakers’ Misconceptions of Metalinguistic
Negotiations, Explained
One objection to the above picture of metalinguistic negotiation is that the model oen-
times goes against the speakers’ own reections and self-reports of what they are doing
in what the model takes to be metalinguistic negotiations.20 Many times the speakers are
under the impression that they are not debating how to use particular words. This is the
problem raised by Herman Cappelen against the metalinguistic model, that the speak-
ers regard themselves as having a debate about torture, not “torture”, when they debate
whether waterboarding is torture. The discrepancy between the model’s prediction and
what the speakers take themselves to be doing in the waterboarding debate requires fur-
ther explanation.21 The paper has two responses to this speaker-error objection. First,
it is dicult for speakers to recognize the non-canonical and metalinguistic nature of
their disputes, but once they do it becomes dicult for Cappelen to explain what is going
on. The speakers usually spend much time looking for potential factual disagreements,
reecting on what they presuppose to be analytically true of the expressions they use,
and collecting cues from their ongoing dispute, before they realize that the literal con-
tents of their assertions are compatible and conrm that their dispute is non-canonical
andmetalinguistic. The well-known dispute about whether Pluto is a planet well demon-
strates such diculty. When the astronomers at rst tried to resolve their dispute over
whether Pluto is a planet, they each brought about facts they thought to be relevant to the
evaluation concerning Pluto’s planet-hood. It soon became clear to many astronomers
that they did not have a consensus over the meaning of the term “planet” because they
failed to see why the facts raised by their colleagues were even relevant. The fact that as-
tronomers could not reach a consensus aboutwhat is relevant in evaluating Pluto’s planet-
hood nally convinced them that they lacked a common way of using the term “planet”
in the rst place, revealing the metalinguistic nature of their dispute. Just like what hap-
pened in the Pluto case, conversational participants approach their non-canonical, met-
alinguistic disputes with the default assumption that it does not involve meaning dier-
ences. In other words, they do not expect to run into contents about words’ meanings
conveyed pragmatically against what they take to be within the ICG. Many times, the face
that conversational parties mean dierent things by the same word only becomes salient
as speakers continue their non-canonical metalinguistic dispute. Peter Ludlow calls the
cues in conversation that allow conversational participants to recognize themeaning dif-
ferences “triggers.”22 The trigger could be the realization that one conversational party
has a broader or narrower modulation of a term (“sh” includes mammals or “athlete”
excludes non-human animals). It could also be the realization of the need for both par-
ties to sharpen a meaning (“planet”) to resolve certain problems (“Is Pluto a planet?”).
Nonetheless, given enough triggers from the conversation, the speakers will be aware
that there is a meaning dierence between them. They will realize that the genuine dis-
agreement behind their dispute is the dierentmeanings they pragmatically advocate for
20Cappelen, H., Fixing Language: an Essay on Conceptual Engineering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): 174.
21Cappelen, 175.
22Ludlow, P., Living Words Meaning Underdetermination and the Dynamic Lexicon (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2018): 40.
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in conversation.23
Cappelen thenhas diculty explaining these caseswhen speakers later admit that
their dispute is about meaning dierences. While the metalinguistic negotiation model
allows for the conversational parties to gradually uncover the fact that their dispute is
non-canonical and metalinguistic, Cappelen must insist that the conversational parties
initially have the correct attitude that their disagreement is over one subject matter, only
to get lost upon further evidence and reections. If the speakers take in all the triggers and
conclude that they are engaging with a dispute concerning the meaning of the contested
term, Cappelen has to argue that these speakers now are mistaken about the nature of
the dispute they have. Moreover, he has to say, somewhat implausibly, that their initial
attitude is correct, but the one they have aer they receive more information from the
ongoing dispute is mistaken.
Besides the above diculty of Cappelen’s challenge, a simpler response is that
most of the time speakers are disposed to seek factual ground for their normative dis-
agreement. They are terrible at overtly normative disputes, so they tend to nd some
factual disagreement to distract themselves from the normative aspect of their disputes.
This may happen because speakers have trouble specifying what they mean by certain
expressions or what particular normative standards they have in mind when using the
expressions under controversial circumstances. Feeling reluctant to appear as if they do
not know what they mean when using these normative terms, the speakers may avoid
directly engaging in the normative disagreement, driven by the recognized social expec-
tation that they should know what they mean or what normative standards they uphold.
Getting caught not knowing what you are talking about looks bad. Inuenced by these
social conditions, people tend to have long grinding debates about whether a dish tastes
delicious, whether a picture looks beautiful, or whether it is morally good to do some-
thing or not in a unique fashion. They keep raising all types of details and facts that the
other partymay nd irrelevant and talking past each other, without pausing to clarify that
they share dierent aesthetical or ethical views or specify their normative standards. Di-
rect engagement in normative disagreement is simply not the norm and there is no good
reason to suspect that metalinguistic negotiation, with its normative aspect concerning
the meanings of expressions, does not fall on the same line.
4 Externalist Arguments and the Limits of
Metalinguistic Negotiations
Another important objection to the metalinguistic negotiation theory is that it is incom-
patible with semantic externalism.24 The theory seems to assume that the speakers have
23An interesting question is whether it is still rational for the speakers to continue using instead of mentioning the term under
dispute aer it becomes common ground that the speakers mean dierent things by the same expression and aim to resolve the
meaning disagreement. The speakers certainly could start tomention the term instead of using it tomore directly litigate themeaning
of the term. However, if the arguments for certain meaning of the term can be conveyed pragmatically, it can still be reasonable to
continue the dispute by using the term and litigating the meaning of the term pragmatically.
24Cappelen, H., Fixing Language: an Essay on Conceptual Engineering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): 173.
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control over the meanings of the terms they use. It takes for granted that the speakers
could cooperatively resolve their metalinguistic dispute by battling over their ICG, rais-
ing reasons for or against certain meanings, and settling on a meaning that the speakers
eventually come to accept. The “shy” case could be resolved with the inspector and the
merchant agreeing that “sh” means sea-creatures. The astronomers could resolve their
dispute by having IAU sharpen the meaning of the term “planet.” However, according to
semantic externalism, this assumed control is largely illusory.25 Many externalist argu-
ments have shown that the grounding facts for meaning consist in part of various exter-
nal, non-psychological facts: meanings ain’t in the head. External factors shape, inu-
ence and determine the intension and extension of linguistic expressions and speakers’
mental contents. These factors include features of the past such as the introductions of
expressions (initial dubbing and “baptism” events), the causal and historic factors of how
people use certain expressions, experts and social institutions, and the list goes on. In
other words, presupposing words to mean something doesn’t make it so.
Here are two examples inspired by Burge (1979) and Kripke (1980). If two naïve
patients talk to each other and agree that they both have arthritis in the thigh, their joint
agreement about how “arthritis” ought to be used will not change the fact that both of
themhavebeenusing the term in awrongfulmanner. If two speakers agree that fromnow
onwhen they speak of “Jane” it no longer designates Jane but Henry, their consensus will
not change the initial event of Jane’s parents’ naming her Jane in the past or disrupt all the
causal chains connecting those who use the name and the initial naming event. The list
of external metasemantic facts — facts that ground the meaning of linguistic expressions
— is long and open. If all these metasemantic facts that x the meaning of the terms are
outside the speakers’ control, it makes acts of metalinguistic negotiation hard to justify,
because there is no way for interlocutors to fruitfully control the relevant metasemantic
facts of meanings that they aspire to negotiate.26
My take of this externalist objection is that it demonstrates the limits of metalin-
guistic negotiations. At rst glance, the scope ofmetalinguistic negotiations could be nar-
row and temporary. It works only on a conversation-by-conversation basis. Speakersmay
not use the meanings of expressions that they agree on in one conversation to navigate
their future linguistic practices aer the conversation is over. Their ICGupdates proposed
by their negotiation process can be eeting, only eective within limited contexts and
timeframes much like Ludlow’s conception ofmicrolanguages, one-o eeting languages
he thinks humans build and discard on a conversation-by-conversation basis.27 Even if
the speakers could agree on the meaning of certain expression in their conversation, the
agreement does not necessarily have any inuence on the conversation next door or any-
one else that uses the expression. It is then important to recognize the dierence between
metasemantic bas, the grounding facts formeaning and reference, andmetasemantic super-
structure, which consists of our beliefs, presuppositions, preference, intentions, theories,
and other attitudes about meanings and reference, what they are and what they ought to
be.28 Given that metalinguistic negotiations take place over the ICG, the changes pro-
25Cappelen, 74.
26Sterken, R.K., “Linguistic Intervention and Transformative Communicative Disruptions”, Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual
Ethics (2020): 422.
27Ludlow, P., Living Words Meaning Underdetermination and the Dynamic Lexicon (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2018): 3.
28Cappelen, H., Fixing Language: an Essay on Conceptual Engineering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): 59.
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posed and made to the ICG throughout the process should be recognized to occur within
the metalinguistic superstructure of the disputed expression instead of the metaseman-
tic base. Metalinguistic negotiations aim at changing what the speakers accept certain
expressions to mean, instead of what certain expressions actually mean. In other words,
the negotiating eorts do not directly change the meanings of certain expressions but
change the meanings the speakers accept for the sake of communication.
Thedierencebetweenmetasemantic superstructure andmetasemantic base can
be seen in howpeople communicate through encryptedmessages. The speakers settle on
a set of rules to take what certain expressions mean in their conditioned conversational
context, without making a commitment about what these expressions mean for them in
other contexts or the actualmeanings of the expressions. In response to the “Lack of Con-
trol” principle of Cappelen that speakers have little or no control over what words mean,
I would like to propose an “In Control” principle that speakers mostly have control over
what they accept to be the meaning of certain linguistic expressions in their ICG through
joint eorts of metalinguistic negotiations.29 It is worth noticing that the “In Control”
principle does not requiremore than the basic premises of Stalnakerian common ground
model, which assume that speakers do at least have control over their common ground
and what they accept. Therefore, semantic externalism is not directly at odds with the
metalinguistic negotiation theory, since it only requires the speakers to have control over
what they accept to be the meanings of linguistic expressions, not control over what the
expressions actuallymean. Amore cynical view is that the speakers couldmake and even
force certain people to misinterpret sentences containing particular expressions by ex-
ploiting the speakers’ charitable interpretative nature, cooperativity and their common
goal of successful communication. A more charitable reading could instead argue that
the end of successful communication justies the means of “forcing” misinterpretation.
If all that the speakers want is eective communication, they could use the expressions as
tools in whatever ways as long as they serve the purpose of successful exchange of infor-
mation. Such an overly simplistic view apparently neglects all the other things speakers
want to achieve through linguistic practices, which might as well constitute good or bad
reasons for speakers to force misinterpretations that do good to them. However, it does
explain howmetalinguistic negotiation should be compatible with semantic externalism.
While it has been conceded that metalinguistic negotiation does not directly leg-
islate the actual meaning of the term the disputants are using, it could still contribute
to diachronic meaning changes, and inuence these meaning shis under the view of
externalism. Aer all, in the “shy” case, the inspector and the merchant cared about
how “sh” is used in their court dispute because they believed the dispute would aect
the court-sanctioned meaning of “sh” and, in turn, aect taxation. But even the idea
that the court decision could eectively change the publicmeaning of terms requires fur-
ther scrutiny. The dispute could still aect the taxation result, even if the court, without
changing the public meaning of “sh”, forced a misinterpretation of the term in the legal
context. The court’s ruling may only work on the metasemantic superstructure of these
expressions, by forcing the participants of trials to accept certain meanings of expres-
sions in court with the aid of the state and its law enforcement, without actually impact-
29Cappelen, 72.
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ing the metasemantic bases and actual meanings of the expressions.30 It is even unclear
whether the court has the supposed control over the publicmeaning of these expressions
since the courtmay not havemuch control over themetasemantic base of words aer all.
The argument is that themetasemanticmechanism that generates currentmeanings and
drives meaning changes remains largely inscrutable.31
It then becomes dicult to come up with a clear and complete picture of how
individual metalinguistic negotiation each contributes to possible public meaning shis.
Still, I want to end the paper by making a few proposals. Consider the example of the
diachronic meaning shi of “salad”. Not too long ago, “salad” meant a cold dish served
with high preponderance of green leaves. A concoction of cold cut fruit would not qual-
ify as salads. Nowadays, however, “salad” could designate various warm leaf-free con-
coctions and concoctions of cold cut fruits. The meaning of “salad”, both its intension
and extension, is observed to have shied through time.32 It is not hard to postulate how
metalinguistic negotiations on a conversation-by-conversation basis could contribute to
such diachronic meaning shi. Maybe at certain point some chefs without much delib-
erate coordination started calling their new warm leaf-free concoctions “salad” in their
menus. Many customers rejected this practice, since they found it inappropriate. Many
conversations took place, involving “this is not a salad,” “the salad has no green leaves,”
or “this is not the salad that I ordered.” Through metalinguistic negotiations, some cus-
tomers would accept the proposed changes to the ICG between them and the chefs, and
carry the changes with them in future conversations, presupposing that “salad” could be
used to talk about warm leaf-free concoctions. The proposed update to themetasemantic
superstructure then occurs on a large scale aswords spread and changes are continuously
being made to the metasemantic superstructure of “salad”, which, in an inscrutable and
yet-to-be-explored manner, continuously inuence the metasemantic base of the word
“salad”. When the change becomes salient enough, someone makes the observation that
themeaning of “salad” has changed. Therefore, as long as an externalist semantic theory
allows for and seeks to explain the diachronicmeaning shis, metalinguistic negotiation,
with its limits and scope of inuence over the ICG and metasemantic superstructures of
interlocutors, could still contribute to and explain certain types of meaning changes in
various ways that require further investigation. For example, if externalists are to believe
that complex use patterns of lexical items overtime constitute part of the metaseman-
tic base of language, metalinguistic negotiations, which revise speakers’ accepted way
of using terms and inuence how they proceed to use those terms, apparently inuence
speakers’ use patterns and contribute to the changes of the metasemantic base. It is not
hard to imagine that countless non-canonical metalinguistic disputes over whether a gay
couple couldmarry each other, whether a husband could rape his wife, or whether whale
oil is sh oil contribute to the supposedmeaning changes of “marry,” “rape” and “sh oil,”
as speakers, via metalinguistic negotiations, discard the old ways and accept newways of




32Dorr, C. and Hawthorne, J., “Semantic Plasticity and Speech Reports”, Philosophical Review, 123, no. 3 (January 2014): 284.
33The same analysis might not apply to natural kind terms, and could work at its best in explaining meaning changes of terms of
groupings that people agree are a matter of choice.
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5 Conclusion
It is best to explain non-canonical disputes that seem to express genuine disagreements
literal expression of incompatible content through the model of metalinguistic negotia-
tion. While the model validates the observation that speakers mean dierent things in
these disputes, it also proves to be compatible with semantic externalism. Metalinguis-
tic negotiations only directly work on what the speakers take the words to mean instead
of the words’ actual meanings that are partially xed by external non-psychological fac-
tors. However, this does not mean that metalinguistic negotiations cannot contribute to
meaning changes of words at all. They still inuence and explain meaning changes by
exploiting an inscrutable relationship between their metasemantic superstructure and
metasemantic base that requires further investigation.
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